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Ethical Problems in Connection with
The Delivery of Legal Services
WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR.*
CODE PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDED LEGAL SERVICES TO THE PUBLIC
When the Code of Professional Responsibility was presented to
the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its 1969
annual meeting by the Special Committee on the Evaluation of Eth-
ical Standards, the only exception taken to any of its provisions
was to that dealing with cooperation by a lawyer with an organiza-
tion engaged in facilitating the delivery of legal services to the
public.' The Code, as drafted by the Committee, and as ultimately
adopted at that time by the House of Delegates, provides that
"a lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that
recommends, furnishes or pays for legal services to promote the
use of his services or those of his partners or associates." To this,
* B.A., Harvard University, 1938; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1941.
Member of the firm of Armstrong, Allen, Bradden, Goodman, McBride &
Prewitt, Memphis, Tennessee.
While the author was a member of the ABA Special Committee on the
Evaluation of Ethical Standards which drafted the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility and also for a time a member and Chairman of the ABA Stand-
ing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility charged with its
interpretation, the views expressed herein are his own and should not be
attributed to either of those committees.
1. Disciplinary Rule 2-103 (D).
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certain exceptions are made; e.g., a lawyer may cooperate in a dig-
nified manner with legal service activities of a legal aid office, a
military legal assistance office, a lawyer referral service, or a bar
association representative of the general bar of the geographical
area.2 A fifth exception, however, is the one which precipitated
the controversy. It permits cooperation with:
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes,
or pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only.
in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation at the time of the rendition of the services requires
the allowance of such legal service activities, and only if the follow-
ing conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation, are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organizations do not include
the rendition of legal service.
(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for legal services
to its members is incidental and reasonably related to the primary
purposes of such organization.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the
rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal services are
rendered, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of
the lawyer in that matter.3
For this, the Association's Special Committee on Availability of
Legal Services recommended the following substitute:
(5) Any other organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only when and
if the following conditions are met:
(a) The lawyer shall not have solicited the use of his services by
the organization or its members in violation of any Disciplinary
Rule in this Code of Professional Responsibility.
(b) The organization shall not derive a profit or commercial ben-.
efit from the rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
(c) A written agreement between the lawyer and the organiza-
tion is in force containing provisions insuring that:
(i) Any member of the organization may obtain legal services in-
dependently of the arrangement from any attorney of his choice;
2. The Code was subsequently amended to define such a bar association-
to include "... . a bar association of specialists as referred to in Disciplinary
Rule 2-105 (A) (1) or (4)." 95 A.B.A. REP. ,146, 304 (1970).
. 3. Disciplinary Rule 2-103 (D) (5). This had been substituted by th&'
Committee for the following language which appeared in an earlier draft:
A professional associatior, tfade association, labor union, or other
bona fide. non-profit organization which, as an incident to its pri-
mary activities, furnishes, pays for or recommends lawyers to its
members or beneficiaries.
(ii) No unlicensed person will provide legal services under the
arrangement;
(iii) Neither the organization nor any member thereof shall in-
terfere or attempt to interfere with the lawyer's independent exer-
cise of his professional judgment;
(iv) The member to whom the legal services are rendered, and
not the organization, is the client of the lawyer;
(v) All parties agree that in providing legal services the lawyer
must comply with all the Disciplinary Rules contained in this Code;
(vi) The nature and extent of the legal services to be rendered
to the members of the group are fully disclosed;
(vii) Any publicity given by the organization to its members will
not describe the lawyer beyond giving his name, address and tele-
phone number and such other information as may be required to
facilitate the access of a member to the services of the lawyer and
any publicity disseminated by the organization to non-members
will not identify the lawyer; and
(viii) The agreement will be terminated in the event of any sub-
stantial violation of the foregoing provisions.
(d) Such written agreement has been filed with the regulatory
agency having authority to discipline the lawyer.4
(e) In the case of such an organization created or operated solely
or primarily for the purpose of providing legal services, the lawyer
shall not render any legal services until there has been obtained
from the regulatory agency having authority to discipline the law-
yer a certificate stating that the operation of the legal services pro-
gram complies with all applicable laws and court rules and with
these Disciplinary Rules. The certificate shall provide that it will
be revoked and the lawyer will terminate his services in the event
of any substantial breach of these Rules or of the agreement pro-
vided for herein.
The reason for the Committee's recommendation is stated in its
report to be that it eliminates "unfortunate and inept language"
in the Disciplinary Rule which "furnishes no reliable standard for
either the public or the profession, invites further regulation by
judicial intervention and places the profession in the deplorable po-
sition of conceding with obvious reluctance that we will honor the
constitutional rights of our prospective clients-but no more. ' 5 At
the same time, in the Committee's opinion, the proposed language
"greatly strengthens the safeguards which will protect both the
public and the profession in the operation of group arrangements
[in that] the controls are carefully tailored to preserve the inde-
pendent exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment and to pre-
vent the exploitation of his services [while the controls remain]
perfectly proper under the Supreme Court decisions."6
4. 94 A.B.A. REP. 389, 694 (1969). This action was taken pursuant to
a reference to that Committee at the Mid-Year Meeting. 94 A.B.A. REP.
138 (1969).
5. 94 A.B.A. REP. 695 (1969).
6. Id.
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The debate upon the proposed substitute language is instructive,
as it raises most of the issues which have since proved fundamental
to the problem of the delivery of legal services under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. William F. McAlpin, of St. Louis,
Chairman of the Special Committee on Availability of Legal Serv-
ices, moved for the substitute on behalf of the Committee, saying
that while both the Committee's proposal and the language of the
Code recognized the existence of group legal services, the language
of the Code made no provision for disclosure or operational regula-
tion of those services. Furthermore, he said, the Code provision
is unworkable, as it leaves open the question of what groups may
provide legal services and fails to indicate whose constitutional in-
terpretation is to be applied, which "may lead to confusion where
state and federal courts differ." "The rule really is an invitation
to further judicial regulation of our profession by more litigation,"
he declared.7
On the other hand, in his words the Committee's proposal "pro-
ceeds from the principle that we, by the nature of our profession
and by virtue of our exclusive license to practice law, have an ob-
ligation, a high obligation, to make our services as readily and fully
available to the public as possible, subject only to such safeguards
as may be necessary to protect a clearly defined public interest."
William J. Fuchs, of Philadelphia, Chairman of the Section of
General Practice, then took up the cudgel in support of the Code
provision, saying that a poll of the more than nine thousand mem-
bers of his section indicated overwhelming opposition to the McAl-
pin Committee's approach, based upon a belief that the need for
more legal services on the part of low and middle income groups can
be met through traditional methods coupled with better law office
management, better information retrieval systems, legal Blue Cross
plans,9 and expansion of lawyer referral services. He also suggested
allowing a tax deduction for legal fees similar to the medical ex-
pense deduction presently allowed. 1'
The fundamental objection to the proposal for expanded group
7. 94 A.B.A. REP. 391 (1969). Mr. Smith characterized the opposing ar-
guments as "heifer dust".
8. Id.
9. Mr. Fuchs offered no explanation of this reference.
10. 94 A.B.A. REP. 391 (1969).
legal services espoused by the McAlpin Committee, in his view, is
that, if adopted,
the laymen will run the practice, and not the lawyers. All the
evils that you can imagine will result from allowing laymen to run
the law practice and not the lawyers: loss of the independence of
the Bar, loss of the traditional client-lawyer relationship, the en-
croachment of advertising, solicitation and the morals of the mar-
ketplace [and] a reduction in the quality of legal services.11
Chesterfield Smith, of Florida, later President of the American
Bar Association, supported the McAlpin Committee (of which he
was a member), saying that its proposal would regulate group legal
services, not expand them, and the choice was whether the legal
profession regulates group legal services or whether it leaves the
regulation to be determined on a case by case basis.12 Henry L.
Pitts, of Chicago, then rose to the defense of the Code, saying that
any liberalization might encourage unions to seek legal services for
their members as fringe benefits, as well as the organization of lay
groups for the express and sole purpose of furnishing legal services.
",Most shocking of all," he concluded, "if this amendment were a-
dopted, it would permit any lawyer employed by the lay agency
who has given advice to a layman in the performance of the law-
yer's duties for that group then to accept employment and fees from
that layman. '13
Arthur W. Liebold, Jr., of Philadelphia, summed up the argument
by saying that he was afraid that members of the profession were
looking at what they wanted to see rather than at what the Su-
preme Court had said. A vote was then taken and, the McAlpin
Committee's amendment having failed, the Code was adopted as ori-
ginally proposed.14
The decisions of the Supreme Court to which Mr. Liebold referred
and which the drafting committee clearly had in mind as the repor-
ter's annotation shows,' 5 are NAACP v. Button,'0 Brotherhood of
R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia,17 and United Mine Workers v. 11.
State Bar Ass'n.' s The first of these validated on constitutional
'bases"s a plan under which the N.A.A.C.P. provided the services
11. Id.
12. 94 A.B.A. REP. 392 (1969).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Note 123 to Disciplinary Rule 2-103 (D) (5), CoDE OF PRoF-ssSioNAL
-RsspoNsamIy (Final Draft, at 42, July 1, 1969).
16. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
17. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
18. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
19. Specifically, the first and fourteenth amendments.
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of lawyers in civil rights cases despite provisions in the Virginia
statutes and the Canons of Ethics which apparently would have
precluded the same. Thereafter, in the Trainmen case, the Court
upheld, also on constitutional grounds, an arrangement whereby,
in violation of the Virginia statutes and the Canon of Ethics, the
Brotherhood channeled F.E.L.A. claims of its members to predesig-
nated attorneys. In United Mine Workers the -Court held that a
union could retain an attorney to assist its members in specified
legal matters.
The basic issue which seems to have divided the two schools of
thought in regard to the provisions of the Code when it was adopted
appears to be whether these opinions represent a delineation by
the Court of the extreme limits to which it is necessary to go in
order to protect rights guaranteed by the Constitution, or whether
they are merely indicative of a general philosophy which must be
permitted to manifest itself in other aspects as well if those rights
are to be adequately protected; in other words, as legal jargon has
it, whether they should be confined to their specific facts. By per-
mitting the otherwise prohibited activities only "to the extent that
controlling constitutional interpretation at the time-requires the
allowance of such legal service activities, '20 the drafting committee
appears to have adopted the more restrictive interpretation and, as
noted, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (its
official governing body) followed its recommendation. Subsequent
events, however, cast grave doubt upon the correctness of this inter-
pretation and upon whether it is presently tenable.
Both the drafting committee and the Special Committee on Avail-
ability of Legal Services terminated their activities in August, 1970.
In the latter's final report, it noted the filing in July, 1964 of the
Progress Report 21 of the Group Legal Services Committee of the
California State Bar, and the signing by President Johnson two
months later of the Economic Opportunity Act, to which the Amer-
ican Bar Association, at its Mid-Year 1965 meeting, pledged its en-
couragement and cooperation in providing legal services for indi-
gents.22 It also noted that the states of California 23 and Florida24
20. Disciplinary Rule 2-102(D) (5).
21. The Committee characterized the Progress Report as "monumental."
22. 95 A.B.A. REP. 754 (1970).
23. Rules of Professional Conduct 20 and 21.
24. Article XIX, Integration Rule of the Florida Bar.
had adopted rules philosophically closer to the Committee's position
than to that of the Code; that a poll of the membership of
the bar of the District of Columbia indicated a preference of
more than two to one for an earlier draft of the Code; 20 that the
Oregon bar had recommended similar action and the Washington
bar was considering doing the same; and that the Supreme Court
of Nebraska, while adopting the balance of the Code, had reserved
action upon this particular section pending further study.26 From
this the Committee concluded:
It seems clear that the last words have neither been spoken nor
written on the subject of group legal services. This Committee is
advised that numerous groups of citizens are considering providing
the services of lawyers to their members through group legal serv-
ice arrangements of one kind or another. This Committee has re-
gretfully concluded that Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D) (5) as adopted
can only lead to further litigation. We are gratified that the courts
and the Bars in the states noted are moving in the direction of the
kind of enlightened recognition and regulation which alone can
avoid further judicial inter-ven-tion. [sic] 27
The prediction of the Committee appears not to have been with-
out foundation. In the final adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, nine states amended the section cited so as to liber-
alize its provisions;2 8 but four deleted it in its entirety,20 thus leav-
ing the rule even more restrictive than before. Much of this was
no doubt due, on both sides, to an additional opinion of the Supreme
Court in which it appears to put an end to any argument about
limiting the Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers cases to
their facts. In United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michi-
gan3" the Court approved a union legal assistance and referral plan
under which the union recommended specific attorneys who had
agreed to limit their fees for handling certain legal matters for
union members and their beneficiaries, saying:
[Tihe principle here involved cannot be limited to the facts of this
case. At issue is the basic right of group legal action.... The
common thread running through our decisions in NAACP v. Button,
Trainmen and United Mine Workers is that collective activity un-
dertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental
right within the protection of the First Amendment. However, that
right would be a hollow promise if courts could deny associations
of workers or others the means of enabling their members to meet
the costs of legal representation.31
25. See note 3, supra.
26. 95 A.B.A. REP. 759 (1970).
27. Id.
28. Florida, District of Columbia, Missouri, Tennessee, Oregon, Hawaii,
Washington, Montana, New Mexico.
29. Louisiana, Mississippi, Iowa, Idaho.
30. 401 U.S. 576 (1970).
31. Id. at 585 (emphasis addled).
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In February, 1968, a Special Committee on Legal Services Insur-
ance had been created by the Board of Governors of the American
Bar Association 32 on the recommendation of the Committee on
Availability of Legal Services33 for the purpose of "limited experi-
mentation with various insurance plans.134 This it accomplished
by the institution of two experimental prepaid legal service plans,
one an insurance pilot project in Los Angeles, California (jointly
sponsored by the Association and the Los Angeles County Bar As-
sociation with the financial assistance of the American Bar Endow-
ment, the Ford Foundation, and the Los Angeles County Bar Assoc-
iation), and the other, a pilot project in Shreveport, Louisiana
(jointly sponsored by the Association, the Shreveport Bar Associa-
tion and the Louisiana State Bar Association with the financial as-
sistance of the Association and the Shreveport Bar Association). 35
In May, 1970, the Board of Governors transferred the jurisdiction of
this Committee to a newly created Special Committee on Prepaid
Legal Cost Insurance,36 which assumed the duties of the subse-
quently terminated3 7 Committee on Availability of Legal Services. 38
In October, 1970, the Committee reported to the Board that its initial
investigations had revealed the magnitude of the legal cost insurance
problem, the rapidly spreading interest in the program, and the
complexity of the legal ramifications involved. In recognition of
the volume and urgency of the Committee's work, the services of
a full time staff attorney were authorized, and the Committee was
empowered to approach law schools and foundations for research
assistance. 39 Such staff assistance was obtained40 and, in August,
1971, the name of the committee was changed to Special Committee
on Prepaid Legal Services, 41 under which name it continues
to be active.
In a report to the 1970 annual meeting, the Special Committee
on Availability of Legal Services recommended to the American
32. 93 A.B.A. REP. 125, 143 (1968). One member of the House of Dele-
gates characterized this action as "a first step towards legal socialism."
33. 93 A.B.A. REP. 125, 231 (1968).
34. 93 A.B.A. REP. 143 (1968).
35. 95 A.B.A. REP. 586 (1970).
36. Id.
37. The Committee's final report appears at 95 A.B.A. REP. 754 (1970).
38. 95 A.B.A. REP. 586, 587 (1970).
39. 96 A.B.A. REP. 168 (1971).
40. 96 A.B.A. REP. 282 (1971).
41. 96 A.B.A. REP. 517, 723 (1971).
Bar Association that it sponsor an expanded program of institu-
tional advertising and public relations to educate members of the
public to recognize their legal problems and the need for legal serv-
ices.42 In doing so, the Committee recognized that although adver-
tising by legal aid agencies was still sometimes challenged, the
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility had
issued an opinion that it is permissible for such agencies to advise
the poor of the availability of legal services to solve their prob-
lems, 43 and pointed out that the Code of Professional Responsibility
obligates the legal profession "to educate laymen to recognize their
legal problems to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of
lawyers and to assist in making legal services fully available." 44
The Committee then noted:
In attempting to aid middle income individuals to recognize legal
problems, it has from time to time been suggested that the prohibi-
tions on advertising and solicitation by individual practitioners be
relaxed. Barlow F. Christensen, in his study entitled "Bringing
Lawyer and Clients Together," published by the American Bar
Foundation in 1968, ably argues that lawyers should "be free to en-
gage in many of the activities now prohibited as 'advertising and
soliciting,' provided they did so in a 'dignified manner.'" Within
this restriction, an attorney would be allowed more directly to as-
sist individuals to recognize their legal problems, In a limited
sense, this is now being done. Attorneys are permitted to write
books and for other publications. They may give public addresses
on legal questions of general interest. Further, as stated in Disci-
plinary Rule 2-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility they
may give laymen unsolicited advice to seek legal services; however,
employment can only be accepted in such instances if the advice
is given to a close friend, relative or former client, or if the ar-
rangement comes within other enumerated categories of the Disci-
plinary Rules. 45
The Committee makes it clear, however, that its proposal is not
for any relaxation of the ethical prohibition against advertising by
individual lawyers, but for a program of institutional advertising
and public relations designed to educate the public about serious
legal problems, again citing the Code of Professional Responsibility
in support of its position:
[Llawyers acting under proper auspices should encourage and par-
ticipate in educational and public relations programs concerning our
legal system with particular reference to legal problems that fre-
quently arise. Such educational programs should be motivated by
a desire to benefit the public rather than to obtain publicity or em-
ployment for particular lawyers. Examples of permissible activities
42. 95 A.B.A. REP. 751 (1970). The recommendation was approved. 95
A.B.A. REP. 545 (1970).
43. ABA INFOmALOPniON 992 (1967).
44. Ethical Consideration 2-1.
45. 95 A.B.A. REP. 752 (1970).
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include preparation of institutional advertisements .... 46
LEGAL AID AGENCIES AN CLINICS
The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, which under the Association's by-laws
is charged with the duty both of interpreting the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and recommending appropriate amendments
to it,47 has dealt with this problem on several occasions. 48 Most
often, it arises in connection with the operation of legal aid agencies.
The objectives of these agencies are stated by the Committee to
be as follows:
Recent years have fortunately witnessed a burgeoning of legal aid
programs for the poor and others unable to afford reasonable fees
for legal services. Subject to local variations, legal aid programs
have as their goals one or more of the following: (1) providing
legal assistance for persons unable to afford the cost of legal serv-
ices; (2) educating the community as to the existence of legal prob-
lems; (3) achieving law reforms through suggested legislation or
test cases; and (4) conducting research into the substantive and
procedural law affecting the poor and others whom legal aid pro-
grams serve.4 9
On August 9, 1970, the Committee promulgated a formal opinion "50
which, assuming these ends to be desirable, directed itself to the
degree to which lawyers cooperating with a legal aid agency could
allow their activities to be controlled by lay directors of the agency
and still come within the ethical requirements of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.-1  Quoting Canon 5 to the effect that "A
lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on be-
half of a client,"52 and also DR 2-103 (D) (1) and DR 5-107 (B), the
Committee reached the conclusion that these provisions "militate
46. Ethical Consideration 2-2.
47. ABA BY-LAws § 30.7.
48. ABA FomwAL OPINIONs 179, 205, 227 and 307, all promulgated prior
to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, in
Formal Opinion 191, the Committee held that advertising by lawyer mem-
bers of a non-bar association sponsored plan violated Canon 27.
49. ABA FoimAL OpmnioN 324 (1970).
50. Id.
51. Particularly Disciplinary Rules 2-103(D) (1), 4-101 (B) (1) and 5-107
(B).
52. And also referring to Ethical Considerations 5-1, 5-21, 5-23 and 5-24
thereunder.
against any interference with the lawyer-client relationship by the
directors of a legal aid society after a case has been assigned to a
staff attorney."53 Accordingly, the Committee held that the rela-
tionship between a board of directors of a legal aid society and the
society's staff attorneys should be governed by certain principles.
Such principles would entail limiting the board's function to that of
formulating broad goals and policies of the society. To this end the
board could establish guidelines respecting the categories or kinds
of clients staff attorneys could represent and the types of cases they
could handle. The board could also require staff attorneys to dis-
close such information about clients so as might be necessary to de-
termine if the broad policies of the society are being carried out.5 4
The Committee subsequently elaborated upon this view in an in-
formal opinion 5 holding improper a requirement that a legal cli-
nic operated by a college of law obtain the approval on a case-by-
case basis of a committee consisting of the dean and faculty mem-
bers before such clinic undertook representation. The Committee
stated:
... the case-by-case review makes it likely that the idependentjudgment of the five clinic lawyers and their loyalty to their clients
will be impaired. Thus the proposed limitations in the third pro-
posal violate the professional ethics and responsibilities of the Dean
and of the lawyer-directors of the clinic. The fact that the Dean
is a lawyer is not relevant for the reason that the Ethical Consider-
ations and Disciplinary Rules of Canon 5 do not contemplate an
exception permitting outside influence by one who happens to be
lawyer.56
Nevertheless, in a later informal opinion 57 the Committee held
that there is nothing improper in the establishment of a committee
of a state bar to oversee the operation of a legal services program,
in a purely advisory capacity, for the purpose of assuring compli-
ance with guidelines formulated by the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity, and that a requirement of prior consultation with such a
committee is likewise not improper. However, in the same opinion,
the Committee held that a requirement of prior approval by the
Executive Director of such a program on a case-by-case basis before
any class action is filed is improper. The opinion does not seek
to rationalize these holdings but merely cites the formal and infor-
mal opinions cited above as authority.
53. ABA FoRmAL OPINION 324 (1970).
54. Id.
55. ABA Iw r oAL OPmNoN 1208 (1972).
56. Id. at 3.
57. ABA INrFoRmA OPmoN 1232 (July 14, 1972).
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This opinion aroused a veritable storm of protest among those
actively engaged in the operation of legal aid agencies. On January
8, 1973, the chairman of the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and
Indigent Defendants of the National Legal Aid and Defender Asso-
ciation (NLADA) addressed on behalf of his Committee a letter 5s
to the chairman of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility seeking some modification of the latter committee's
views as expressed in the informal opinion referred to above. In
that letter, the Committee supports the establishment of a pure liai-
son committee, if that is truly the function conceived for it, citing
the standards of its own organization on the subject of "Relations
with the Bar":
Every legal aid organization should seek to establish working rela-
tionships with the organized bar and other attorneys in the com-
munity and should vigorously pursue efforts to gain understanding,
participation, and support from them. A Liaison Committee can
usefully perform some of this function.59
However, the letter expresses doubt that this is truly the in-
tended function of the contemplated committee, as its charge to as-
sure compliance with OEO guidelines implies an investigative func-
tion. Accordingly, the letter continues:
Beyond subjecting legal services attorneys to a special form of pro-
fessional oversight or scrutiny not applied to private practitioners
this committee will needlessly duplicate functions of existing bod-
ies. First, there is no reason to expect that the standards embod-
ied in the Code of Professional Responsibility and enforced by ap-
propriate committees of local bar associations will provide insuf-
ficient protection against improper conduct by legal services attor-
neys.
Second, Formal Opinion 324 recognized that the Board has the obli-
gation to ensure that its policies are being carried out by the staff.
It can be assumed that such policies are in line with the Economic
Opportunity Act, OEO Guidelines and grant conditions or the grant
to the program would not be made by OEO. If there are com-
plaints against the activities of the program the above finding of
Formal Opinion 324 dictates that the board, at least insofar as the
allegations refer to activities which violate the board's guidelines,
should properly hear these complaints. If the complaints allege a
violation of the Economic Opportunity Act or OEO Guidelines by
the legal aid society, the complaint should be made to OEO as a
function of its responsibility to monitor the activities of its grantees.
In this regard Section 222 (a) (3) of the Economic Opportunity Act
and OEO instruction 6140-1, dated June 13, 1969, already ade-
58. Reproduced in full at 31 NLADA BIEFCASE 381-83 (1973).
59. NLADA STANDARDs AND PRACTICES FOR Civm LEGAL AID No. 16.
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quately provide for the state and local bar associations in the com-
munity served by the Legal Aid Society to be consulted by OEO
and afforded ample opportunity to submit to OEO comments and
recommendations on the operations of the project. Informal Opin-
ion 1232 stated that your Committee did not 'think that the exis-
tence of this committee to perform the functions outlined in the cor-
respondence . . .violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.'
If that is true, we respectfully submit to our brethren that the true
reason therefore is that the Code was not drafted with an eye to
these kinds of situations. Rather, the situation presented is more in
the nature of a political question, one that neither the Code nor your
Committee was established to answer. Stating that the condition
does not violate the Code may leave the reader with the impression
that the Code approves of such conduct. If the question is one for
which the Code does not provide an answer, that should be clearly
stated.60
The letter also takes issue with the opinion on the question of
control by the Executive Director. It again cites the NLADA stan-
dards upon this point which notes that the internal operation of
a legal aid organization should follow the model of a private law
firm. "Like senior partners, the directing or executive attorneys
must have final authority over the decisions that are made by the
legal staff."61
On February 27, 1974, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility declined to reconsider its opinion, saying "the
Committee does not see how it can be a violation of the Code to
require consultation with a committee of lawyers if that is de-
sired. ' 62 Thereafter, the Committee released another informal
opinion predating both its refusal to reconsider and the NLADA
letter,63 holding a restriction upon legislative advocacy on behalf
of qualifying clients to be permissible, on the grounds that the
Code's prohibition against interference with attorneys' exercise of
independent judgment does not render improper rules of the organ-
ization prohibiting staff attorneys from undertaking such activities
on behalf of clients in the first instance.
Again NLADA requested reconsideration by the Committee, say-
ing:
I [sic] submit that the 'matters' these attorneys undertake on be-
half of their clients are the problems poor people come to the law-
yer for professional assistance in resolving and that restricting
these lawyers from utilizing certain services or legal tools on their
clients' behalf, such as legislative advocacy or litigation if the other
party is a governmental agency, is a most dangerous encroachment
60. 31 NLADA B~mFcAsE 383 (1973).
61. NLADA STANDA--S AND PRACTICES FOR CIvm LEGAL AiD No. 12.
62. ABA .nFomrAL OPmION 1262 (1973).
63. ABA IwromAL OPInow 1252 (1972). Actually the opinion was not
released publicly until March, 1973.
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on the ethical foundations of the profession, discriminates against
those attorneys because they are being paid for by someone other
than the client, and prevents their clients from receiving full, com-
petent, professional representation, simply because they cannot af-
ford to pay for the services. 64
And again the NLADA standards were cited, this time to the fol-
lowing effect:
Assistance furnished by the organization should encompass all legal
work required by the case, including representation before adminis-
trative, judicial, and legislative bodies. Appeals should be taken
in all cases where appellate review might result in a decision that
would better the condition or enhance the legal rights of the per-
sons served by the organization and if such an appeal is in the in-
terest of and desired by the client.6 5
A comment appended to this standard appears to be in direct con-
flict with the informal opinion:
The type of service available to a legal aid client should not be
limited by the forum in which assistance is needed. If clients seek
representation in securing changes in legislation or in presenting
contentions before county boards or city councils or in procuring
loans from a bank or governmental agency, nothing in the nature
of legal aid work or the functions of the legal aid lawyer should
preclude such assistance being given. In like manner, if the case
requires presentations to an appellate court, there should be no rule
or standard preventing such representation. 66
In the September, 1973, issue of the American Bar Association
Journal,07 the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
published notice of a public hearing to be held in San Diego, Cali-
fornia on October 25, 1973, during the annual meeting of the
NLADA for the purpose of discussing the following issues:
(1) Canon 2 requires a lawyer to assist the legal profession in
fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available. To what extent
64. 31 NLADA BRIEFCASE 462 (1973). In an earlier statement, the
NLADA had stated that the two earlier opinions "exhibited little sensitivity
to the letter and spirit of the ABA's own Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, especially as it applies to legal service attorneys," that they were obvi-
ously "arrived at intentionally," and that the later opinion and the reasons
supporting it "exhibit the most serious misunderstanding yet by the Ethics
Committee of the manner in which restrictive conditions allow political and
other improper pressures to interfere with the kind of professionalism legal
service attorneys strive for in living up to their obligations under the Code."
Id. at 383.
65. NLADA STANDARDS AND PRACMCES FOR CIVIL LEGAL AID No. 9.
66. Id., comment.
67. 59 A.B.A.J. 976 (1973).
may a nonprofit legal assistance office publicize its activities and
those of the lawyers acting on its behalf without a violation on the
part of those lawyers of the prohibition against solicitation? (D.R.
2-101, D.R. 2-102(A), D.R. 2-103(A) and (B), and D.R. 2-104(A).)
To what extent may a nonprofit legal assistance office suggest to
individuals that its services be utilized without the lawyers acting
on its behalf violating the rule against barratry? (D.R. 2-104.)
(2) Canon 5 requires a lawyer to exercise independent Profes-
sional judgment on behalf of a client. To what extent may the or-
ganizational rules and regulations or operational methods of a non-
profit legal assistance office limit or restrict the activities of law-
yers acting on its behalf without placing those lawyers in violation
of the rule requiring the exercise of their independent judgment in
legal matters? (D.R. 5-107 (B).) To what extent may a non-profit
legal assistance office act on behalf of various clients without caus-
ing the independent professional judgment of the lawyers acting
for them to be adversely affected? (D.R. 5-105 (B).)
(3) Canon 4 requires a lawyer to preserve the confidences and
secrets of a client. To what extent may a nonprofit legal assistance
office allow its activities to be examined and administered without
violating the rule requiring the preservation of the confidences and
secrets of a client? (D.R. 4-101.)
(4) Canon 3 requires a lawyer to assist in preventing the unau-
thorized practice of law. To what extent may a nonprofit legal as-
sistance office subject itself to the control of laymen or lay organi-
zations without the lawyers acting on its behalf violating the rule
against associations between lawyers and laymen for the handling
of legal matters? (D.R. 3-102 and 3-103.) 08
The hearing was held and produced a substantial response includ-
ing numerous suggestions for liberalizing the Committee's position
in regard to the activities of legal services lawyers. 69 In response,
the Committee prepared and published in the March, 1974, issue
of the American Bar Association Journa70 a draft of a new formal
opinion 71 dealing with the subject, which was promulgated in its
final form on August 10, 1974.72
This opinion deals with the subject under three headings: pub-
licity, independence of professional judgment, and preservation of
confidences. As to the first, it makes no radical departure from
preexisting opinions on the subject 73 except to interpret one of
them74 to permit a legal service office to advertise its availability
to handle a certain type of litigation desired to test a specific legal
68. Id.
69. See Ethical Aspects of Restrictions on (Non-Profit) Legal Assistance
Offices. NLADA, 1973.
70. 60 A.B.A.J. 329 (1974).
71. ABA FORMAL OPnIoN 334.
72. See generally 60 A.B.A.J. (October, 1974).
73. Primarily, ABA INFORIAL OpINIONs 1172 and 1227.
74. ABA INrFOMAL OPnION 1234.
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situation, although it may not solicit individual plaintiffs for that
purpose. However, under the heading of independence of judgment,
while previous opinions on the subject 75 are generally reaffirmed,
it is made clear that once a staff attorney has undertaken to repre-
sent a client no limitation can be placed upon the means which
he uses to do so other than that prescribed by the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility itself, and no requirement of prior consulta-
tion which would interfere with this right can be permitted. How-
ever, the requirement of prior approval of a senior attorney in a
legal services office was expressly upheld. The Committee stated:
It must be recognized that an indigent person who seeks assistance
from a legal services office has a lawyer-client relationship with
its staff of lawyers which is the same as any other client who re-
tains a law firm for a fee. It is the firm, not the individual lawyer,
who is retained. In fact, several different lawyers may work upon
different aspects of one case, and certainly it is to be expected
that the lawyers will consult with each other upon various ques-
tions where they may seek or be able to give assistance. Staff
lawyers of a legal services office are subject to the direction of
and control of senior lawyers, the chief attorney, or the executive
director (if a lawyer), as the case may be, just as associates of a
law firm are subject to the direction and control of their seniors.
Such internal communication and control is not only permissible
but salutary. It is only to control the staff lawyer's judgment by
an external source that is improper.76
On the question of seeking legislative relief on behalf of clients
of a legal services office, the Committee interpreted its former opin-
ion 77 as follows:
The opinion certainly does not hold that a lawyer employed by a
legal services office may not engage in law reform or seek to secure
the passage of legislation. In fact, it says specifically that 'any
lawyer, whether he drafted legislation for a client or not, may of
course as a citizen, gratuitously engage in activities of a political'
nature in support of it.'
What the opinion does hold is that the governing body of a legal
aid society may broadly limit the categories of legal services its
lawyers may undertake for a client, and that in doing so it may,
but need not, exclude political activity and lobbying. There are
three important qualifications inherent in this statement. First,
in the absence of such affirmative action by the board, no such lim-
itation exists. Second, the action of the board must be a broad lim-
itation upon the scope of services established prior to the ac-
75. ABA Fonivr OPINION 324; ABA INroum L Opn t Ns 1232 and 1252.
76. ABA FoRmAL OPINioN 334.
77. ABA INroRmA_ OPINoN 1252.
ceptance by the staff lawyer of representation of any particular
client, and preferably made known to its public and staff in ad-
vance like any other limitation on the scope of legal services of-
fered. Once that representation has been accepted, under DR 5-
107 (B) and DR 7-101 nothing can be permitted to interfere with
that representation to the full extent permitted by law and the dis-
ciplinary rules, including, of course, legislative activity.7 8
On the subject of preservation of confidences, the Committee
again reiterates the holding of an earlier opinion7 9 to the effect that
under proper safeguards such information as is necessary for rea-
sonable research and statistical study as well as for the normal op-
eration and supervision of the legal services office may be made
available.
Finally, the Committee concludes:
Viewing the problems discussed above on the aspirational level of
the code's ethical considerations, we stress that all lawyers should
use their best efforts to avoid the imposition of any unreasonable
and unjustified restraints upon the rendition of legal services by
legal services offices for the benefit of the indigent and should seek
to remove such restraints where they exist. All lawyers should
support all proper efforts to meet the public's need for legal serv-
ices.80
GRouP LEGAL SERvIcEs
Meanwhile in the area of group legal services a similar re-evalu-
ation was taking place. At the annual meeting of the American
Bar Association in 1970 the General Practice Section had opposed
any liberalization of the Code of Professional Responsibility, say-
ing:
The Section has opposed the expansion of "Group Legal Services"
beyond that already permitted by various Supreme Court decisions,
on the basis that expanded "Group Legal Services," including the
practice of law by laymen-dominated groups organized solely for
the purpose of practicing law, would inevitably destroy the inde-
pendence of the Bar. The quality of legal services would diminish.
The advertising that even the proponents of "Group Legal Serv-
ices" admit will necessarily accompany the new group practice,
would reduce the legal profession to the level of the ordinary mar-
ket place.8 '
Nevertheless the Special Committee on Legal Cost Insurance re-
78. ABA FoRmAL OPInmoN 334.
79. ABA INFORMAL OPINIoN 1081. An earlier report of an American Bar
Foundation committee studying Wisconsin Judicare took the position that
"the threat that divulging such minimal information poses to 'privilege,'
'confidentiality,' or 'personal privacy' has been overstated, and the result
in fact is to exhibit more concern for the sensitivities of those delivering
the service than for those receiving it."
80. ABA FORMAL OPmioi; 334. Cf. Ethical Consideration 2-25.
81. 95 A.B.A. REP. 1111 (1970).
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ported to the Mid-Year meeting of the Association in the following
year, that
there is a developing demand in a representative cross-section of
communities and groups across the country for prepaid legal ser-
vice arrangements [which] will probably increase [with] a fairly
well defined trend towards group legal services in some areas
based largely upon the relative speed and simplicity (and some pos-
sessiveness by the lawyers involved) as compared with the more
complex insurance program, requiring the bar if it is interested in
fostering and promoting plans based upon insurance principles and
incorporating the concept of free choice of attorney-[to] be pre-
pared to move swiftly to cut through the myriad problems involved
in setting up such programs.82
And six months later, it reported to the annual meeting that during
the interval it83 had received over 200 inquiries regarding prepaid
legal services, at least ninety percent from lawyers and covering
four-fifths of the states of the United States, England and Canada.
From this it concluded that "It is clear that there is a growing inter-
est by the profession in exploring prepaid legal services.18 4
The next year saw the publication of an extensive study funded
by the American Bar Foundation of the responsibility of the bar
for the delivery of legal services in which the following statement
is made:
The profession has a duty. Fine! But nowhere has the Code
spelled out a duty on the part of the individual practitioner. The
Ethical Considerations in Canon 2 prayerfully suggest that the in-
dividual will take the responsibility of serving those who cannot
normally pay for services. What is prayed for in the Ethical Con-
siderations is negated by the Disciplinary Rules. There one finds
not the slightest hint of disciplinary action against a lawyer who
refuses to take a client who cannot pay, or an unpopular client,
or a client who is unable to get service elsewhere. In fact, the old
ethical standards are retained. Discipline is promised only to those
who would seek to aid a client through other than approved chan-
nels.8s
82. 96 A.B.A. REP. 283 (1971).
83. And the Shreveport and Los Angeles projects, which it sponsored.
84. 96 A.B.A. REP. 283 (1971).
85. F. MA.Rs, K LEsvwnG & A. FoInwsxY, THE LAv zE, TBE PUBLIc AND
PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBIrY 263 (1972). The report elsewhere stated, how-
ever, that the Code of Professional Responsibility "reflected an understand-
ing of the need to extend services to new groups through existing forms
of professional organization, and contemplated the probable emergence of
new forms." Id. at 187, citing Ethical Consideration-25 [sic].
To this challenge the Committee on Ethics and Professional Res-
ponsibility responded with two opinions"0 rendered on the same
day, the first upholding cooperation by lawyers with a so-called
'eopen panel" group legal services arrangement provided their pro-
fessional judgment remains unimpaired and there is otherwise com-
pliance with the Code of Professional Responsibility,8 7 and the other
holding that cooperation with a so-called "closed panel" plan is not
per se improper.8  In the first of these, the Committee had before
it certain standards proposed by the Committee on Prepaid Legal
Services and adopted by the House of Delegates with the amend-
ment that the Association "strongly urges that each plan provide
that the members or beneficiaries have freedom of choice of attor-
neys ['open panel'] in the rendering of legal services under the
plan. ' ° Under these circumstances, the Committee felt the func-
tion of the plan was to serve as no more than "a source of funds
with which to pay the attorney." Further, it was held that the
publicizing of the plan as such did not constitute a violation of the
canonical provision against solicitation, but was merely institutional
advertising. The Committee, therefore, did not consider whether
such a plan came within a permissible exception to DR 2-103 (D).
In the case of "closed panel" plans, however, the Committee held
that "it is a question of fact in each situation whether an acceptance
of employment under the plan violates any of the three rules," that
is, against publicity, promoting the use of the lawyer's services, and
obtaining employment as the result of unsolicited advice. Even if
there were a violation of one or more of these rules, the panel noted,
the plan might still come within one of the exceptions created by
DR 2-103 (D).
The opinions represented a substantial advance from the Commit-
tee's earlier position but still it was not enough. As John G. Bon-
omi stated in his very informative remarks delivered at a confer-
ence on prepaid legal services in Washington, D. C. on April 28,
1972:00
[Any thoughtful consideration of Disciplinary Rule 2-103 inevit-
ably leads to one conclusion: This Disciplinary Rule was not de-
signed to cope with the solicitation and other ethical problems pre-
sented by the legal service plans which have been published since
1969. While this Disciplinary Rule was an adequate instrument
for regulating solicitation under the conventional union sponsored
86. ABA FORMAL OPINoN 332 (1973); ABA FORMAL OpinioN 333
(1973).
87. ABA FORMAL OpmoN 332 (1973); 59 A.B.A.J. 442 (1973).
88. ABA FORMAL OpiNO 333 (1973); 59 A.B.A.J. 443 (1973).
89. See generally 97 A.B.A. REP. (1972).
90. See Disciplinary Rules 2-101(B), 2-103 (D) and 2-104(A).
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legal service plans, the framers of the Code did not and could not
have foreseen the type of plans which have emerged over the past
three years.9 1
Obviously some alteration in the Code itself was needed. So, in
October, 1973, the Committee gave notice of another public hear-
ing 2 to be held in Chicago on December 1 of that year. Again
the hearing was well attended, and a variety of views were ex-
pressed. Out of it came proposals for changes in the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility which were presented to the House of Dele-
gates of the Association at its Mid-Year 1974 meeting.
Meanwhile, forces outside the legal profession were converging
to bring pressure for changes in the Code. On September 20, 1973,
the Subcommittee on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee9 3 began its hearings, in the course of which
the American Bar Association was called upon to express its views.
In a letter to Senator Tunney, the Committee's Chairman, Chester-
field Smith, President of the American Bar Association, stated
that "there is no activity of the Congress which is more im-
portant to the American Bar Association and to the national legal
profession for which it speaks than that of your subcommittee; nor
is there in my judgment any other congressional activity which has
a greater possibility for lasting benefit for the citizens of our coun-
try in our never ending search for equal justice for all."9 Presi-
dent Smith pledged the cooperation of the officers and staff of the
American Bar Association, and noted the pending report of a survey
of legal needs and the utilization of legal services initiated by the
Association95 as well as the recent appointment in May, 1973, of
a Special Committee on the Delivery of Legal Services 6 which was
91. Transcript of proceedings, National Conference on Prepaid Legal
Services, American Bar Association at 142. Mr. Bonomi while not a mem-
ber of the drafting committee for the Code, met with it on numerous occa-
sions.
92. 59 A.B.A.J. 1189 (1973). The Committee circulated its proposed
changes in the Code widely prior to the meeting.
93. Under the Chairmanship of Senator John V. Tunney (hence the
"Tunney Committee"). An informative report on "Reducing the Costs of
Legal Services" was prepared for the Subcommittee by Thomas Ehrlich and
Murray L. Swartz, deans respectively of the Stanford and University of
California Law schools, under date of October 8, 1974.
94. 59 A.B.A.J. 1299 (1973).
95. B. CuRAN & F. SPAULDING, THE LEGAL NEEDs Or s PuBTic (1974).
96. The Committee filed its joint report at the Mid-Year 1974 meeting
of the American Bar Association.
charged with studying alternative methods of providing legal serv-
ices to various moderate income groups and the public generally,
making recommendations concerning the provision of legal services,
and educating and involving members of the bar in improving the
delivery of legal services.
The proposals made to the Mid-Year 1974 meeting of the House of
Delegates for amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity97 are described by the Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility as follows:
The primary changes are designed to eliminate the portions of DR
2-103(D) (5) which we believed to be of doubtful constitutionality
under the UTU decision; to require, as a matter of ethics, compli-
ance by 'qualified legal assistance organizations' (as defined in the
recommendations) with applicable laws, rules of Court and other
legal requirements (the new subdivision (e) of DR 2-103 (D) (5);
to bar such organizations initiated by lawyers for personal gain
(the new subdivision (f)); and to make the ethical requirements
consistent with the lawyer's 'duty to make legal counsel available.'
(Canon 2).98
However, the Section of General Practice took issue with these
proposed changes, and offered substitute amendments of its own.0D
The Section's report notes in regard to "closed panel" group legal
procedures, that "during the past ten years, this method of delivery
has undergone a remarkable expansion," but goes on to state that
"to permit the present trend to continue is not in the interest of
the public," saying:
Is the closed panel method of delivering legal services likely to pro-
vide the public with the quantity and quality of lawyers' time to
which it is entitled under our system of government? There is al-
ready a disaffection with such institutions, a feeling that in this
society the individual counts for too little. A union member will
not be able to distinguish a union lawyer from other union officials.
If he is compelled to disclose his personal problems to the union
lawyer, he will lose a little more of his individuality. There will
be yet a greater percentage of his income which will be expended
without his personal exercise of choice. The union member will
wonder why the lawyer to whom he is directed should not have
been first tested in the open market and selected by him on the
basis of reputation in the same manner as the wealthy select their
lawyers. He may also wonder how a union lawyer may be expert
in the two hundred specialties into which the practice of law may
be divided.100
97. Similar proposals had been made to the 1973 Annual Meeting but
withdrawn pending the public hearing.
98. ABA 1974 MID-YAR MEETG, SUMnvMnY AN REPORTs, REP. 127 at 10,
as amended by a substitute resolution.
99. ABA 1974 MID-YEAR MEETING, SummARY AND REPORTS, REP. 118, as
amended by a substitute resolution.
100. ABA 1974 MIm-YER MEEING, StnvmY Am REPoRTs, REP. 118, at
14.
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Accordingly, the Section drafted its proposed amendments to the
Code upon a different philosophy from those advanced by the Com-
mittee:
The purpose of the proposed revisions to the Code of Professional
Responsibility are [sic] to enable the disciplinary authorities in
each state where the amendments are adopted to better police and
control the growth and development of prepaid legal service plans
and to assist lawyers to determine the plans with which they may
properly and ethically cooperate. The proposed new ethical con-
sideration, EC 2-33, alerts lawyers to the possibility of conflict of
interest when employment is accepted under prepaid legal service
plans which do not offer the members or beneficiaries a free choice
of counsel.'0 '
After heated debate, the proposals of the Section were adopted
by the House of Delegates. 10 2 However, at the 1974 annual meet-
ing, upon the recommendation of the Special Committee on Prepaid
Legal Services, an Ad Hoc Study Group was created to make recom-
mendations to the House of Delegates at its 1975 Mid-Year meeting
with regard to amendments to DR 2-103 and 2-104 and the adoption
of EC 2-33.103 Meanwhile it was suggested to all interested entities
that any action in regard to amending the Code in accordance with
the resolution adopted earlier "be taken only with the knowledge
that the matter is scheduled for further consideration by this associ-
ation."' 0 4 And so, the question remains open pending such consi-
deration.
A FINAL NoTE ON OuR DuTY
During the ABA 1974 Mid-Year meeting, Senator Tunney held
fact finding hearings at Houston, and at the annual meeting in
Honolulu he spoke to a joint session of the American Judicature
Society and the National Conference of Bar Presidents. In
that speech he suggested that the bar is more interested in financial
return than public service and is failing to live up to Canon 2 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 0 5 If there is foundation
101. Id. at 13.
102. ABA 1974 Mm-YAR MEmTa, GEImUA PACTICE SECTION, SUmmARY
OF ACTION REP. 118, at 6.
103. This ad hoe committee has now filed its preliminary report, in which
it basically follows the suggestions of the General Practice Section.
104. ABA 1974 ANNuAL MEETING, Su mmY oP AcTIox 8.
105. 19 ABA NEws 522 (1974). See also 58 Amv. Jun. Soc. J. 108 (Octo-
ber, 1974).
for this view, then it is indeed a sad commentary upon our profes-
sion. Obviously the public demand for adequate legal services at
a reasonable cost is growing, and if the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility presents an obstacle to the furnishing of such services
then the Code should be altered to meet the exigencies of the situa-
tion, while retaining traditional safeguards to the maximum extent
compatible with such an objective, but only to that extent. If we
fail in this, we fail in that duty which alone justifies the preferred
position which we, as lawyers, enjoy in the exclusive right to prac-
tice law. But we must not fail; and, if we have the breadth of
vision to put aside self interest for public interest, we will not fail.
Then at last we may reach the point which with remarkable clair-
voyance Justice Roger Traynor saw clearly almost a quarter of a
century ago when he said in his dissent in Hildebrand v. State Bar
of California:106
Given the primary duty of the legal profession to serve the public,
the rules it establishes to govern its professional ethics must be
directed at the performance of that duty.
106. 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 225 P.2d 508, 519 (1950).
